

## SARS Coronavirus

### Disease Agent:

- SARS coronavirus

### Disease Agent Characteristics:

- Family: *Coronaviridae*; Genus: *Coronavirus*
- Virion morphology and size: enveloped, helical nucleocapsid, spherical to pleomorphic, kidney-shaped, or rod-shaped particles, 100-130 nm in diameter
- Nucleic acid: linear, positive-sense, single-stranded RNA, ~29.8 kb in length
- Physicochemical properties: Virions sensitive to treatment with lipid solvents, nonionic detergents, formaldehyde, and oxidizing agents; stable in feces and urine at room temperature for at least 1-2 days, especially if diarrhea is present (high pH); only minimal reduction in infectivity after 21 days at 4°C and reduced by one log only after 48 hours at room temperature; heating to 56°C inactivates the agent quickly

### Disease Name:

- Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

### Priority Level:

- Scientific/Epidemiologic evidence regarding blood safety: Theoretical
- Public perception and/or regulatory concern regarding blood safety: Very low as there here have been no cases since 2004. It is likely that reemergence of agent would alter public perception.
- Public concern regarding disease agent: Moderate; it is likely that reemergence of agent would alter public perception.

### Background:

- First cases occurred in Guangdong province in November 2002.
- Major outbreaks occurred in various countries in Southeast Asia (China/Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Singapore) from March through June 2003 and ended by July 2003.
- A North American outbreak occurred during the same time frame in Toronto.
- These outbreaks were categorized as having an unusually high level of infectivity through community exposure.
- There were very few well-documented SARS cases in the US.
- A few additional cases were reported in late 2003 and early 2004, and no cases have been reported since May 2004.

### Common Human Exposure Routes:

- Bulk of spread is via droplets.
  - Up to 100 million genomes per mL are found in nasopharyngeal secretions detected in 32% of patients at mean 3.2 days after onset of illness and in 68% at Day 14.
  - Aerosol spread may occur during invasive procedures, such as endotracheal intubation.
- Contact with secretions or excretions of SARS-infected patients
  - Viral RNA detected in stool samples from 97% of patients 2 weeks after onset and in 42% of urine samples.
  - Fecal-oral transmission is strongly suspected.

### Likelihood of Secondary Transmission:

- Significant by direct contact with symptomatic cases

### At-Risk Populations:

- Family members in close contact with cases
- Health-care workers in close contact with cases
- Elderly and immune compromised individuals appear at increased risk.

### Vector and Reservoir Involved:

- The civet cat (palm civet) in Southeast Asia is the likely source of introduction of the agent into humans. The SARS CoV RNA sequence found in palm civets is 99% identical to that found in humans. Similar RNA sequences have been found in bats, snakes, and monkeys.

### Blood Phase:

- No data on viremia during asymptomatic phase
- Viral RNA is detectable in plasma from 2-16 days after onset of acute illness with one study reporting peak levels at days 5-7 of illness.

### Survival/Persistence in Blood Products:

- Unknown

### Transmission by Blood Transfusion:

- No cases have been documented.

### Cases/Frequency in Population:

- Over 8000 cases and 900 deaths were reported to the World Health Organization, as of August 2003.
- No community acquired cases since May 2004
- Sporadic cases associated with laboratory accidents have occurred.

### Incubation Period:

- 2-10 days

**Likelihood of Clinical Disease:**

- Most cases are thought to be symptomatic.
- Manifestations are shorter and milder in children.

**Primary Disease Symptoms:**

- Patients usually hospitalized 3-5 days following the onset of symptoms with clinical deterioration in the second week and recovery in the third week. Symptoms include fever, nonproductive cough, myalgia, dyspnea, headache, malaise, diarrhea, nausea/vomiting, high respiratory rate (>35/min), or progressive respiratory failure.
- From 14 to 26% of patients require mechanical ventilation.

**Severity of Clinical Disease:**

- Severe
- 20% of patients required ICU admission in a case series of 144 cases.
- Asymptomatic infection as evidenced by seropositivity in case-contacts has been reported.

**Mortality:**

- Case fatality rates range from 6.6 to 17.1%.

**Chronic Carriage:**

- No

**Treatment Available/Efficacious:**

- Supportive care
- Several antiviral drugs that have in vitro activity are available, but clinical efficacy has not been proven and resistance is a major concern.

**Agent-Specific Screening Question(s):**

- The FDA recommended a series of questions in the spring of 2003 when the SARS epidemic occurred.
  - In the past 28 days, have you been ill with SARS or suspected SARS?
  - In the past 14 days, have you cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with body fluids of a person with SARS or suspected SARS?
  - In the past 14 days, have you traveled to, traveled through, or resided in areas affected by SARS?
- Subsequently, with cessation of new SARS cases, the FDA removed the recommendation for these questions.

**Laboratory Test(s) Available:**

- No FDA-licensed blood donor screening test exists.
- Diagnostic assays include virus culture, NAT, and virus detection by immunofluorescence in tissue samples.

**Currently Recommended Donor Deferral Period:**

- The FDA recommended the following deferral criteria in conjunction with the agent-specific screening questions, while new cases were being identified.
  - 14 days from last exposure or 14 days after arrival in the US following travel/residence exposure
  - 28 days after complete symptom resolution and the cessation of any treatment

**Impact on Blood Availability:**

- Exposure to diagnosed SARS cases had minimal impact, but deferral based on travel/residence had moderate local impact during the outbreak period with loss of a large number of prospective donors dependent on the magnitude and location of the epidemic.
- Laboratory test(s) available: Not applicable

**Impact on Blood Safety:**

- Agent-specific screening question(s): Unknown, as transfusion transmission has not yet been proven.
- Laboratory test(s) available: Not applicable

**Leukoreduction Efficacy:**

- Unknown

**Pathogen Reduction Efficacy for Plasma Derivatives:**

- Multiple pathogen reduction steps used in the fractionation process have been shown to be robust in removal of enveloped viruses.

**Other Prevention Measures:**

- Developmental pathogen reduction methods (psoralens, riboflavin) have been shown to be effective.

**Suggested Reading:**

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